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Abstract 
 
Introduction of foot and mouth disease (FMD) into country typically initiates 
eradication procedures removing animals from the market, and halts the export of 
livestock products from the infected country. The magnitude of these effects can be 
highly uncertain. This paper presents a stochastic dynamic programming model which 
simulates possible market implications of alternative FMD and export scenarios in the 
Finnish pig sector. It takes into account dynamics and adjustment of the animal stock, 
price movements and uncertainty related to the duration of the trade ban. Results 
suggest that losses to pig producers can increase considerably when the risk of 
prolonged export ban increases. Production adjustments also strengthen. Consumers 
can gain from a trade ban, because options to adjust supply in the short run are limited.  
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Introduction    
  
It is one of the vital tasks of society to secure food supply. This requires that risk and 
economic losses caused by different types of hazards are under control. Studies show 
that events related to animal diseases can cause heavy losses to individual producers 
and society (e.g. Franks et al. 2001; Thompson et al. 2002; Mangen and Burrell 2003; 
Schoenbaum and Disney 2003; Bennett and Ijpelaar 2005; Neumann et al. 2005). 
Highly contagious animal diseases such as avian influenza, foot and mouth disease or   3 
classical swine fever can have particularly devastating economic impact on food 
production in the affected country. Due to their threat to animals, human health and/or 
livestock production, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) puts special 
emphasis on preventing these diseases from spreading, and governments often control 
combating highly contagious animal diseases. Policy in the European Union (EU) 
includes measures such as the culling of all susceptible livestock at infected premises, 
disinfection measures, restrictions on animal movements, possibly the culling of 
uninfected herds at infection risk, and compensations paid for agricultural producers 
due to their losses (e.g. European Commission 2001, European Commission 2003).  
An outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease typically affects 
livestock market by removing animals from the market and reducing export demand 
for animal products unexpectedly. The trade effect is due to the fact that importing 
countries can prohibit imports of livestock and livestock products from the infected 
country or region. Foreign trade thus becomes one-sided: infected region can import 
livestock products but not export them (hereafter called as the trade ban). Producers in 
export-oriented countries can be hit particularly badly, if they face excess supply and 
suffer from plummeting producer prices. Ekboir et al. (2002) also point out that if 
exports are allowed, disease status of an exporting country affects export prices of pig 
meat because markets are segmented according to country’s disease status. 
When planning disease policy, it is important to take into account that 
economic agents can minimise losses due to an epidemic by adjusting production and 
consumption decisions. Adjustments can sometimes, however, result in undesirable 
behaviour which flaws disease policy. Stakeholders therefore need information on 
how an epidemic affects market, food supply and demand.    4 
This paper examines the adjustment of pig production to an animal 
disease epidemic. We raise two major aspects regarding the adjustment. Firstly, even 
if the characteristics of an epidemic depend on the structure of farming, agricultural 
producers face a great uncertainty about the number of animals removed from market 
and the duration of export distortions. It is important to take this uncertainty into 
account in the adjustment process. Previous studies modelling the pig sector (e.g. 
Mangen and Burrell 2003; Niemi et al. 2008) have paid attention to the fact that 
epidemic duration is stochastic. According to our knowledge, less attention is paid to 
how uncertainty affects market when it is explicitly taken into account in production 
decisions. Mahul and Gohin (1999) have illustrated that uncertainty related to disease 
spread affects the choice of disease control policy. We provide an example on 
modelling market dynamics when trade ban duration is stochastic. It illustrates how 
the pattern of production adjustment depends on the expected duration of epidemic. In 
particular, it matters whether disease shock extends to two or more production cycles. 
This may have significant impact on production in an export-oriented country. 
Secondly, livestock production is inelastic in the short run. When an 
outbreak occurs, producers are unable to quickly increase aggregate production 
because it takes time to produce reproduction animals or to raise fattening animals. 
Even if producers are able to decrease production in the short run e.g. by culling 
animals prematurely, it may be costly for an individual producer to reduce yield levels 
or the number of animals in stock unless policy or market explicitly provide incentives 
for such behaviour. This is an important issue from the modelling point of view, 
because models of agricultural economics typically operate at annual level where   5 
production is fully adjusted according to the market, whereas production dynamics 
imply that producers have limited options to adjust production in the very short run.  
This paper contributes to the discussion about the role of economic 
incentives in animal disease risk management. It also contributes by illustrating 
modelling and policy issues which are ignored in animal disease analysis, but which 
are important for estimating and mitigating losses caused by animal disease epidemics. 
Our goal is to simulate market losses caused by a FMD outbreak to pig production 
sector and consumers in Finland. The production volume of modelled sector is around 
210 million kg pig meat per year, of which about 20% is exported. Beef and milk are 
excluded from the analysis for simplicity. The decline of beef prices and subsequent 
impact on pig meat prices due to FMD is assumed to be modest in Finland since beef 
exports are few compared to imports. The analysis is carried out with a recursive 
dynamic programming (Bellman 1957) model. It optimises the supply of pigs by 
taking into account the best interest of producers and consumers in Finland, and price 
movements induced by the epidemic and the trade ban. Epidemiological scenarios are 





Dynamics of disease and market 
 
The dynamic programming model maximises the value of Finnish pig market and 
simulates market implications of an epidemic. It takes into account both uncertainty   6 
related to the future of the epidemic (figure 1) and biological dynamics of pig 
production (figure 2). At each time period the state of market is characterized with one 
of two alternatives: {trade ban, no trade ban}. Epidemic in this paper refers to the 
hypothetical scenario that FMD would have been observed
1 in Finland and the trade 
ban is assumed as a direct consequence of it. The trade ban is imposed by importing 
countries and it can last longer than the epidemic. OIE (2007) recommendations 
already suggest the trade ban to be removed 3 months after the disease has been 
eradicated from a country free from FMD without vaccination.  
Losses due to disease epidemic are obtained as difference in the value of 
pig production sector when market are at the state “trade ban” rather than being at the 
state “no trade ban”. As figure 1 illustrates, when starting from a given state of nature 
at period t, the subsequent period t+1 market can enter either of two alternatives with 
probability associated to the current epidemiological state. Thus, decisions made at 
market can be updated according to the state observed when time passes from period t 
to period t+1. Since sow farrows approximately every sixth month, decisions made 
currently are linked to time period which is six months from now and decisions or 
states between these periods are assumed to separate. 
The model simulates demand, supply and market clearing price at pig 
meat market using monthly steps and thus taking into account biological constraints 
(figure 2). Representative agent’s objective is to maximise the market value of pig 
production minus production costs plus consumer surplus. “Consumer” here includes 
meat processing, retail and final consumers. The model is solved numerically and it 
produces socially optimal production pattern by allocating piglets to reproduction or 
                                                 
1 Finland is free from FMD. The disease was last observed in Finland in 1959.   7 
fattening and by adjusting slaughter weights. It also takes into account the number of 
sows, weaners and hogs currently kept in Finland, biological dynamics of production 
process, and the impact of export distortions. Due to biological constraints and long-
term marketing contracts between retailing and meat processing, supply, demand and 
prices are in fact quite inelastic in the very short run.  
Demand for pig meat is stratified into four market and equations which 
are estimated from Finnish meat market data. These equations represent domestic 
demand (
dom
t D ), export demand to EU (
EU
t D ) and non-EU (
row
t D ) countries separately, 
and import demand (
imp
t D ). Imports and Finnish meat are considered as an imperfect 
substitutes. In demand equations, meat prices in Finland, import and export prices and 
a set of seasonal dummy variables explain the amount of meat demanded.  
Even if the trade ban interrupts export of pig meat from Finland for an 
exogenously given time, all meat does not physically enter domestic market because 
of meat storing. Storing capacity is, however, quite limited. Based on our data, 
approximately 33% of exports to non-EU countries and 9.5% of exports to EU-
countries are due to changes in meat storing. Thus, we assume that once a trade ban 
occurs, the amount of excess meat entering domestic market is 67% of exports to non-
EU countries and 90.5% of exports to EU countries. In addition, marketing contracts 
between meat industry and retailing affect market prices. The terms of meat deliveries 
in Finland are generally agreed some four months ahead in time. Thus, meat demand 
and meat prices in the domestic market are partly fixed and large changes in pig meat 
prices are ruled out in the short run by contracts. This limitation is relaxed over time.  
 
   8 
The Bellman equation 
 
Optimizing agent maximises consumer surplus from consuming Finnish and imported 
meat and producer profits. The Bellman equation is of the form: 
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) ( t x t V  is the maximised net present value of Finnish pig meat market (i.e. 
“consumer” surplus plus producer profits); t is time index measured in months;  t x  is 
the vector of state variables;  t u  is the decision rule;  ) , , (
dom dom
t t u x t t Q P  is inverse 
demand function for domestic demand, which is used when integrating the area from q   9 
to market allocation 
dom
t D  below the demand curve;  ) , , (
imp imp
t t u x t t Q P   is inverse 
demand function for import demand, which is used when integrating the area from q to 
market allocation 
imp
t D  below the demand curve;  ) , , (
EU EU
t t u x t t Q P  is export price at the 
EU market as a function of the state and control variables and quantity (
EU
t Q ) exported 
to the EU market; and  ) , , (
row row
t t u x t t Q P  is export price at the non-EU market as a 
function of the state and control variables and quantity (
row
t Q ) exported to the market 
outside the EU;  ) ( t t u , x t C  characterizes production costs incurred at period t; β  is 
discount factor;  ) (• E is expectations operator;  ) ( 1 1 + + t x t V  is the value of sector in the 
subsequent period;  ) , ( t t u x t S  is the aggregate quantity of Finnish pig meat supplied to 
market; 
sow
t x  is the number of sows in Finland which were inseminated at period t-4 
and farrow at period t; 
pig
t x  is the number of pigs which were born at period t-9 and are 
allocated to reproduction or slaughtered at period t, and which by definition is a 
function of  the number of sows;  ) (
pig
t x δ  and  ) (
sow
t x δ  indicate how the epidemic 
affects the number of pigs and sows on farms; 
ban
t x  is state variable characterizing 
which share of export market are closed at period t; 
serve
t u  is control variable 
characterizing the number of pigs currently allocated to reproduction;  
weight
t u  is 
decision variable characterizing slaughter weight per hog; r  is the share of sows 
removed from the stock each period; 
pig
t y  is effective piglet yield per sow;  ) Pr(
ban
t x  
characterizes the probability of trade ban in the subsequent period, given current 
period trade ban status ; and  ) ( T x T V  is the value function for the terminal period t=T.
  Equation 1 considers welfare changes in Finland only. Effects to 
consumers in other countries or effects to other sectors are excluded from the analysis.   10 
Transition equations imply that an insemination today shows up as hogs sold to 
slaughter almost one year from now. The supply of pig meat depends on the share of 
pigs at slaughter age, slaughter weight and the low-valued meat obtained from 
removed sows. The aggregate quantity of Finnish pig meat sold at different market is 





Probability parameters included in the model utilize Poisson process, which suits well 
into the logic of dynamic programming (cf. Dixit and Pindyck 1994, p. 85-87). This 
property is due to the fact that Poisson process has “no memory”. This paper assumes 
that the trade ban can have a minimum duration (m), which implies that the probability 
parameter is set 
b
t λ =0 in the beginning of an epidemic. In general, the probability of 
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where d is expected duration (d) of the trade ban and m is the minimum duration. 
If the trade ban is imposed for the first time at period t′, we can compute prior 
probability for the event that the trade ban is still imposed at period t. Equations 3a 
and 3b illustrate how this can be done for the median epidemic scenario and for the 
large epidemic scenario when 
a
t λ is zero:    11 
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where t is the time period under examination (t>t′), and t′ is time period when the 
trade ban was imposed for the first time. The difference t-t′ indicates the number of 
time periods passed after trade ban was imposed. For instance, when the trade ban’s 
expected duration is 4 months, the probability that the trade ban is still imposed 9 
months later in the median epidemic scenario is 4 %.  
The existence of a marketing contract between meat industry and 
retailing is modelled with expected probabilities which utilise Poisson process and pay 
an income transfer between producers and consumers according to a probability 
parameter. It is used to ration cuts in producer prices and thus income losses in the 
beginning of an epidemic so that the model would fit better in the current structure of 
Finnish meat market. Probability of a marketing contract is formed as a joint 
distribution by using the fact that slaughterhouses and retailing sector in Finland 
generally agree meat deliveries four months ahead and assuming that in the short run 
(<10 months) stakeholders take into account expected export market situation, which 
in turn is affected by expected probability that export demand recovers when entering 
period n. This implies that if quantity supplied would be fixed, producer losses and 
price reductions would increase over the first few months after imposing the trade ban, 
but be expected to recover when time passes.   12 
Data and parameter values 
 
Data for demand function estimation were obtained from statistics and they consisted 
of monthly observation for January 1997-November 2006. Quantities and values of 
exports and imports were retrieved from the Eurostat website (Eurostat 2007). These 
data were used to calculate representative import and export prices. Data on prices and 
meat production in Finland were obtained from the information Centre of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry in Finland. All prices used in the estimation were deflated 
with consumer price index (Statistics Finland 2007) and logarithmic transformation
2 
was applied on other estimation variables than dummy variables.  
Demand functions were estimated with three-stage least squares 
procedure provided by Le Sage (2004).  Elasticity estimates of demand for pig meat 
with respect Finnish pig meat price were (t-statistics in parenthesis) -0.97 (-3.0) for 
export demand to EU countries, -0.51 (-3.4) for export demand to non-EU countries, 
0.87 (1.1) for import demand, and -0.14 (-2.2) for domestic demand. Export demand 
equations were estimated using export prices and domestic and import demand 
equations using producer prices as explanatory variables. In the course of 
optimisation, export prices for Finnish pig meat were set to equal domestic producer 
price plus fixed margin, which was estimated from the data. 
Piglet production costs were obtained from the website of ProAgria 
Association of Rural Advisory Centres (ProAgria 2007). Variable production cost 
( ) , (
weaner
t t u x t C ), excluding the cost due to replacement gilts (€350 per purchased gilt), 
was generally €55.84 per weaner. This figure and piglet yield were adjusted according 
                                                 
2 ln(Demand)=ln(Explanatory variables)   13 
to the share of gilts in the sow stock. Variable production costs (€/slaughtered hog) 
including  feed, weaner, labour and miscellaneous cost, minus subsidy payments were: 
 
(4)  
) , ( - 10 ) 0.26(  
10 ) 9.46( -   10 ) 119.88( 0064.64 - 1216.24 ) , (
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which excludes fixed production costs (
fixed
t C ) of about €5.4 million per month and 
replacement costs. The cost function was based on Finnish Feeding recommendations 
and growth models provided by Niemi (2006). 
Capacity costs were used to calibrate the model. Capacity costs to take 
into account that it is costly for an individual producer to keep capacity units idle if 
market prices cover variable costs. If prices are favourable, efficient producers can 
have incentives to enter the market or to expand production. The cost of capacity was 
structured as a function of producer price at disease-free time and meat supply:  
 
(5)  ) , ( ) ) , ( ) , ( / ) ) , ( ((
producer fixed capacity
t t t t t t t t u x u x u x u x t t t t t t S P S C C C α − − + = , 
where  ) , (
producer
t t u x t P  is the price producer is expected to receive during the disease-
free time and α=0.5 is a calibration parameter, which refers to the cost of capital.  
When solving slaughter weight, it is taken into account that in the short-
run production costs are mostly sunk costs. Furthermore, reducing meat yield per 
weaner incurs additional costs as production capacity is used less efficiently: 
 
(6) 
kg.   5 . 84   all for                        84.5) - )( ) 0.011(
0.114 - (-71.4989 ) , ( 0.0679 ) , (
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   14 
Expenditures paid by public funds are approximated based on 





Several scenarios with respect to epidemic were formed. Each epidemic scenario was 
a combination of three different characteristics. Firstly, epidemic size, which affected 
the number of pigs animals ( ) (
pig
t x δ  and  ) (
sow
t x δ ) kept at infected farms and thus 
removed from the stock, was either <0.2% of pig population (hereafter median 
epidemic) or about 2% of pig population (hereafter large epidemic). Epidemic size 
was based on separate epidemiological simulations performed by the Finnish Food 
Safety Authority (Lyytikäinen and Kallio 2008). Secondly, the trade ban’s expected 
duration was set 0, 4, 6 or 8 months for a median epidemic and 0, 5, 7 or 9 months for 
a large epidemic. Of these periods, the first month was unavoidable during a median 
epidemic and first two months during a large epidemic. Zero duration refers to the 
case where trade ban would not take place. Expected duration of trade ban affects 
probability 
b
t λ  in figure 1. Thirdly, the probability that a trade ban would occur when 
entering subsequent production cycle (
a
t λ  in figure 1) was assigned values 0 %, 5 % or 
10%. This probability refers only to cases were there is no trade ban imposed at period 
t. As a combination of these, 12 scenarios are examined (Table 1). It is emphasized 
that these scenarios consider mainly the cases where exports are fully halted. 
Regarding the baseline scenario, which refers to simulating market when 
there is no FMD involved, the model was calibrated so that at the equilibrium it   15 
produced average monthly prices and demand quantities for the year 2006. Constant 
terms in each demand equation was adjusted so that the data met average monthly 
prices and demand quantities in 2006, and then adjusting the cost of capital so that 
meat supply correspond 2006 figures. The model was solved numerically for the 
period T=60 and by discretizing state and control spaces. Results should be interpreted 





Production and price adjustments 
 
Results suggest that producers are able to adjust supply in the short run through hog 
slaughter weights and by storing meat for later export market procurement. While 
storing activities are implicitly included in demand functions, insemination decisions 
and slaughter weights are solved explicitly. Despite the fact that production decisions 
can be adjusted, producer prices of pig meat fall when trade ban is imposed. If market 
become fully closed, price reductions in scenario typically range from €0.27 per kg to 
€0.42 per kg or more, which correspond 21% and 33% decrease in producer prices, 
respectively. Prices decrease more when trade ban’s expected duration increases, as 
well as when time passed after imposing the trade ban increases, i.e. first month of the 
trade ban implies smaller price reduction than second, third, etc. month. In contrast to 
this, after lifting the trade ban prices typically rise above those in the absence of an 
epidemic. Prices soar especially if epidemic is expected beforehand to be large and   16 
trade ban be long-lasting, but it becomes only large epidemic. Then, both epidemic 
and production adjustments decrease meat supply after the epidemic. 
Producers generally have little incentives to adjust slaughter weights. In 
contrast to this, the number of sows responds to increased risk of prolonged trade ban. 
In scenarios which assume trade ban to last for 4-5 months, the risk of long-lasting 
trade ban decreases meat supply in the subsequent production cycle by about 0.5%. If 
expected duration increases by further 2 months, total decrease in production is close 
to 2% (depending on scenario). If the trade ban is expected to last 8 months, meat 
supply in the subsequent parity could decrease by 3-4% and producer prices after the 
trade ban increase by €0.19-€0.29 per kg.  
The importance of the number of inseminated sows increases, when the 
expected duration of export distortions increases to cover over two or more parities. 
When the trade ban’s expected duration increases, price reductions become larger and 
production quantities decrease, but in a nonlinear manner. When export distortions are 
expected to last for several months, animal stock adjustment option is valuable enough 
to be used, and producers benefit from the opportunity to reduce excess meat supply.  
In the very short run (<4 months), producers may bear quite large 
reductions in pig meat price, because about half of production costs of pig meat are 
sunk cost, and marginal cost for fattening pigs is just around €0.6 per kg and day. For 
an individual producer and society it seems beneficial to fatten pigs currently in the 
stock until regular slaughter weight, and only thereafter have a break in production. 
Even if producers had market power to recover prices back to disease-free time prices, 
it would require 10-15% reduction in the production volume.     17 
On the other hand, if the epidemic would remove very large number of 
pigs from the market and thus result in temporary undersupply and high prices, 
producers would have incentives to benefit from favourable prices by increasing 
slaughter weights and increasing imports. In contrast to this, in the medium-long run 
(>6 months) most scenarios assume that market situation improves. Incentives to 
reduce supply therefore decrease and adjustments remain still small as long as variable 
costs exceed meat price. Producers nevertheless take into account that the trade ban 
may extend to two or more parities when they choose to inseminate less gilts.  
 
Impact of epidemic size and duration on simulated disease losses  
 
Simulated welfare losses to consumers, producers and public funds due to a trade ban 
and epidemic range from zero to €0.41 per kg pig meat produced per month. When 
examined separately, producers loose and consumers gain from an outbreak combined 
with a trade ban. Net loss increases when market distortions expand over several 
months, or over two or more production cycles. When normalised according to the 
trade ban’s expected duration, epidemic and trade ban jointly result €3-7 million in 
losses per month. A large epidemic generally result about €1 million in higher 
expected losses per month than a median epidemic. In most scenarios, consumers gain 
between €1-2 million per month from a trade ban whereas producers generally loose 
€4-8 million per month. Consumers benefit more from a median epidemic than from a 
large epidemic when benefits are measured both in absolute losses per epidemic and 
losses per month under the trade ban. A large epidemic incurs about €5 million more 
in direct costs paid by public funds than a median epidemic (table 2).    18 
When a trade ban is imposed on Finnish pig meat exports, the median 
epidemic can incur more than €27 million in economic losses to society in six months. 
Producers can loose more if the epidemic is large than if it is median. This result in 
table 2 is due to the fact that scenarios assume the large epidemic to last longer than 
the median epidemic. It can be shown that producers can be better off in a large 
epidemic, which removes a lot of animals from the market, than in a median epidemic. 
Thus it is a matter of the trade-off between epidemic size and the trade ban duration. 
Compensations paid to producers and elasticity of demand also affects the result. Even 
the large epidemic is nevertheless quite small in terms of the number of affected pigs. 
An increase in the expected duration of export ban affects losses in a 
nonlinear manner (table 2). Increasing the expected duration from 4 to 6 months in a 
median epidemic (ceteris paribus), for instance, increases the total loss by €10.8 
million. Two months more in the trade ban’s expected duration increases total loss by 
further €13 million. Corresponding figure for consumers’ welfare gain are €4.4 and 
€7.3 million, respectively, and for producer income loss €15.1 and €20.3 million. 
Marginal effects are higher for a large epidemic than for a median epidemic.  
 
 
Impact of probability of disease introduction on simulated disease losses  
 
When the probability of market distortions suddenly increases, the value of pig sector 
decreases. Most scenarios assume that the probability of having a trade ban and FMD 
is negligible. Aggregate welfare over the 30-years-period decreases by €12.6-39.2 
million when probability of experiencing a new trade ban in six months increases from   19 
zero to 5 % or 10%. The loss depends on the size of an epidemic and the probability of 
disease introduction (
a
t λ  ) (table 3). When probability 
a
t λ  increases from 0 to 5%, 
quantities traded in the market slightly (<1%) decrease and consumer welfare 
therefore decreases. Producers also suffer from increased cost of disease risk. The 
figures are well below €0.01 per kg pig meat produced over 30 years. We emphasize 
that 5% and 10 % scenarios represent quite high probabilities when compared to the 
fact that FMD has not been observed in Finland since 1959. 
Losses due to a trade ban and FMD epidemic may also increase, but not 
those of producers. In fact, since the risk of trade ban decreases the value of disease-
free pig sector and since producers are compensated for lost animals, producer losses 
due to individual epidemic can decrease when 
a
t λ  increases. Increase in total loss per 
epidemic in that case is mainly due to increased direct costs, which in our simulations 
are exogenously given. It is a consequence of introducing the cost of trade ban risk 
into the model that both value functions shift.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper has provided one example on how to simulate market implications of 
possible FMD epidemics when trade ban duration is unknown. Results suggest that 
trade ban duration can have large impact on losses. When the expected duration of the 
trade ban increases, losses increase at an increasing rate for durations which we 
simulated. Results also suggest that if export market become completely closed and 
remain closed for sufficiently long time, meat market can in practice collapse. That is,   20 
if there is a large excess supply after current marketing contracts terminate, meat 
buyers can use their market position and temporarily push down prices.  
Given quite small direct impact of FMD on the animal stock, it is not 
surprising that the trade ban is the main reason for disease losses once it is imposed. 
Previous studies have already shown that consequences of a disease listed by the OIE 
can result in losses to producers (e.g. Thompson et al. 2002; Mangen and Burrell 
2003; Schoenbaum and Disney 2003; Rich and Winter-Nelson 2007), and that 
consumers can even gain from a trade ban (e.g. Mangen and Burrell 2003).  
Trade ban duration is an important issue, because the durations of 
epidemics can vary quite a lot (e.g. Kobayashi et al. 2007, Velthuis and Mourits 2007, 
Lyytikäinen and Kallio 2008). Results from earlier studies also suggest that a large 
FMD or CSF epidemic tends to have longer duration than a small epidemic (e.g. 
Mangen, Nielen and Burrell 2002; Velthuis and Mourits 2007; Raulo and Lyytikäinen 
2005; Lyytikäinen and Kallio 2008). Taking into account OIE recommendations it 
seems reasonable to assume that if trade bans are imposed, large epidemics on average 
result in longer trade bans than small epidemics. If these correlations are strong 
enough, the risk of trade ban motivates producers as a group to put effort on disease 
prevention, but this may not hold for individual producers who take prices as given. 
Based on our results, reducing epidemic duration is likely to reduce market losses. 
Governments can do market interventions during an epidemic. One 
intervention is that animals on infected farms are culled and their value is 
compensated for producers, for instance, by using prices observed before the 
epidemic. If animals are compensated generously and producer prices fall, some 
individual producers may be tempted to reduce losses by ignoring good hygienic   21 
practices. This may be a problem despite the fact that infected premises must be kept 
idle for a specified time. Solving this problem demands stakeholders to provide such 
producers a way out. It could, for instance, justify buying-out schemes and storage 
aids paid to industry during an epidemic. Thus, it is argued that market interventions 
during an epidemic are justified from the incentives point of view in the sense that 
they can enhance producer motivation to maintain proper biosecurity when market 
situation is poor. Market interventions can also help to secure food supply during 
crisis e.g. when it would be profitable to reduce yield levels and thus destroy 
production and welfare. One downside of market interventions is that in disease-free 
time they can result in producers to under-price the cost of disease risk. Thus, price 
insurance should be conditional on good biosecurity practices. Our results combined 
with low probability of disease introduction in many industrialized countries suggest 
that levy per unit of output to finance market losses of highly contagious animal 
diseases shouldn’t bee too large. 
Losses are partly associated to the fact that meat storing capacity is 
insufficient to handle large amounts of excess meat. Thus there is only a small buffer 
to stabilize meat market. If the risk of prolonged trade ban increases, meat supply 
could reduce over time as forecast profitability of pig production weakens and thus 
provides producers with incentives to cut production. If government wishes to reduce 
possible market adjustment due to the risk of the trade ban, it is essential that the 
disease is eradicated rapidly, which reduces the risk of long-lasting trade bans.  
According to our results producers are reluctant in adjusting production 
when they face plummeting prices. There can be several plausible reasons for this. 
One major reason is the fact that production costs are mostly sunk cost in the short run   22 
and the cost of feeding few more days is probably less than the price of additional 
kilogram of pig meat. Reduced slaughter weight would also increase production costs 
per kilogram of meat. Sunk costs imply that it is hardly ever profitable to reduce 
slaughter weights. Producers nevertheless take into account that the trade ban may 
extend to two or more parities when they choose not to inseminate all sows. E.g. low 
productivity animals may be removed from the stock. Transaction costs may also 
increase due to premature culling of animals. Another reason driving the relatively 
sluggish production adjustment in our results could be functional forms
3 used in the 
demand equations and very inelastic domestic demand, according to our estimation 
results. Hence any improvement in product prices would require a significant, and thus 
costly, decrease in production when there is severe oversupply. 
It is difficult to compare specific market implications to those obtained 
in other studies, because they depend on issues such as the structure of livestock 
production, disease, export orientation and elasticity estimates. We estimated own-
price elasticity of domestic demand at -0.14. When compared to some other studies, 
this suggests that our losses per kilogram of pig meat produced can be quite high for a 
long trade ban. It also implies that if epidemic would be exceptionally large, producers 
in disease-free areas could benefit from the epidemic considerably.  
Modelling approach proposed in this paper has the potential to examine 
how rationally behaving producers could adjust production after observing epidemics 
and export shocks of different magnitudes. Models such as this are best suited for 
comparing differences in results between scenarios. In contrast to this, the results of an 
                                                 
3 Logarithmic demand equations make price adjustments proportional to 
meat  quantity.  When  meat  supply  changes  but  export  status  is  constant,  price 
movements in absolute terms are larger when there is oversupply than when there is 
undersupply.    23 
individual scenario should be interpreted with caution, as they are affected by 
parameter values, such as elasticity estimates, calibration values and production costs, 
which are to some extend normative. Our approach could be complemented by more 
thorough analysis of behaviour of consumers, producers and adjustment options. As 
the duration of market shock seems to be important, an interesting application is to 
combine epidemiological and economic models in order to study disease policy issues 
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Figure 1. Possible transitions from each market state (denoted with superscripts a and 
b) between successive time periods t, t+1,…,T, and corresponding transition 
probabilities 
a
t λ  and 
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Figure 2. Illustration of information and good flows and time lags in the model. 
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Table 1. Characterization of scenarios examined. 
  
Epidemic size, % 
of pig population 
culled 




t λ ) 
Probability of a new 
trade ban at subsequent 
production cycle (
a
t λ ) 
 Scenario 1  Median, <0.2 %  0  0% 
 Scenario 2  Median, <0.2 %  4  0% 
 Scenario 3  Median, <0.2 %  6  0% 
 Scenario 4  Median, <0.2 %  8  0% 
 Scenario 5  Median, <0.2 %  4  5% 
 Scenario 6  Median, <0.2 %  4  10% 
 Scenario 7  Large, 2.0%  0  0% 
 Scenario 8  Large, 2.0%  5  0% 
 Scenario 9  Large, 2.0%  7  0% 
 Scenario 10  Large, 2.0%  9  0% 
 Scenario 11  Large, 2.0%  5  5% 
 Scenario 12  Large, 2.0%  5  10% 
   29 
Table 2. Simulated changes in the welfare of producers, consumers, public funds, and 
the total loss due to epidemics which are of different size, where the expected duration 
of the trade ban varies from 0 to 9 months and the probability of a new trade ban 
taking place in the subsequent production cycle varies from 0 to 10%. 
Event type  Welfare effects (€ million) 
Epidemic  Duration  Introduction  Consumers  Producers  Public funds
1)  Total loss 
Median  0  0 %  -0.4  1.0  -0.6  0.1 
Median  4  0 %  5.5  -21.7  -0.6  -16.7 
Median  6  0 %  9.8  -36.8  -0.6  -27.5 
Median  8  0 %  17.1  -57.1  -0.6  -40.6 
Median  4  5 %  5.0  -18.9  -1.3  -15.2 
Median  4  10 %  6.8  -16.1  -1.9  -11.2 
Large  0  0 %  -7.8  10.7  -5.7  -2.8 
Large  5  0 %  3.6  -24.4  -5.7  -26.6 
Large  7  0 %  7.2  -41.6  -5.7  -40.1 
Large  9  0 %  18.4  -69.3  -5.7  -56.7 
Large  5  5 %  3.0  -21.2  -12.9  -31.1 
Large  5  10 %  4.8  -18.1  -19.3  -32.6 
1) Exogenously given. Direct costs added on top of the total loss.   30 
Table 3. Changes in the welfare of stakeholder groups under the median and the large 
epidemic scenarios when the probability (introduction, %) of facing 4 or 5 months 
trade ban and disease losses in the subsequent production cycle increases from zero to 
5 % or 10%. 
Event type  Welfare effects (€ million) 
Epidemic  Duration  Introduction  Consumers  Producers  Public funds
1)  Total loss 
Median  4  5 %  -3.7  -8.1  -0.7  -12.4 
Median  4  10 %  -8.0  -16.8  -1.3  -26.1 
Large  5  5 %  -3.6  -8.6  -6.8  -19.0 
Large  5  10 %  -7.9  -17.8  -13.5  -39.2 
1) Exogenously given. Direct costs added on top of the total loss. 
 